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Transforming the Public Employee                   
Speech Standard in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille:                                
More than Meets the Eye 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the middle of last century, the United States Supreme 
Court has evaluated speech restrictions imposed by the government 
on its employees with an evolving standard that balances the interests 
of government efficiency and free speech. This doctrine has been 
gradually refined by case law capped by the Court’s 2006 decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos,1 crystallizing a three-part inquiry into the 
protected status of public employee speech under the First 
Amendment. In its 2008 opinion, Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School 
District No. 84,2 the Ninth Circuit addressed a specific implication of 
the Garcetti decision, deciding whether the Supreme Court’s latest 
innovation in its protected status inquiry presented a purely legal 
question, as historically treated, or a mixed question of fact and law. 
In deciding that Garcetti transformed the inquiry into a mixed 
question, the Ninth Circuit significantly shifted the delicate balance 
established by the High Court over decades, opening the door to 
prolonged factual trials and increased settlement costs in public 
employee retaliation claims. The circuit court’s twist on the legal 
review standard of the test bucks an ingrained practice of 
constitutional safeguarding by the courts in the contours between 
free speech and its competing interests and threatens to upset the 
Supreme Court’s carefully crafted compromise. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The case stems from a lawsuit filed by Robert Posey against Lake 
Pend Oreille School District No. 84, alleging that the School 
District’s elimination of his position constituted retaliation in 
violation of the First Amendment.3 In Posey’s capacity as a “Security 
Specialist” for Sandpoint High School, he became concerned about 
 
 1.  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 2. 546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 3. Id. at 1123. 
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what he perceived to be certain inadequacies in the school’s safety 
and security policies and enforcement of these policies.4 After failing 
to generate a satisfactory response from the school’s principal, Posey 
expressed his concerns in a letter delivered to several school and 
district administrators.5 The letter addressed concerns about various 
flaws in Sandpoint’s policies and the school administration’s response 
to related problems, as well as Posey’s personal grievances stemming 
from his ongoing tension with the school’s administration.6 
Following the letter’s delivery, Posey met with two of the 
administrators at his home, outside of school hours, to discuss his 
concerns.7 
Sometime later, Posey learned that his current duties would be 
consolidated, along with several other employees’ responsibilities, in 
a new position.8 Posey applied for the new position but was not 
hired, effectively terminating his employment with the School 
District.9 Following the School District’s grievance and appeal 
process, which ultimately failed to reinstate him, Posey filed suit in 
Idaho state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the 
District’s elimination of his position and failure to rehire him 
amounted to retaliation for his letter and meeting with school 
administrators, in violation of the First Amendment.10 The School 
District removed the case to Federal District Court and, following 
discovery, moved for summary judgment.11 The School District 
argued that Posey’s speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment because he made the statements pursuant to his duties 
as “Security Specialist.”12 
The district court agreed and held, as a matter of law in 
accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos,13 that Posey’s speech was not protected by the 
 
 4. Id. at 1123–24. 
 5. Id. at 1124. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1125. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, No. CV05-272-N-EJL, 2007 WL 
420256, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007). 
 13. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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First Amendment.14 According to Garcetti, the district court 
explained, employee statements made “‘pursuant to their official 
duties’” are not constitutionally protected speech.15 Under this 
standard, the district court concluded that Posey spoke in his 
capacity as an employee of the School District.16 He did not 
communicate through the newspaper or his legislators, as a private 
citizen might, and his statements stemmed from the types of 
activities that he was paid to perform.17 As Posey’s speech was thus 
unprotected under the First Amendment, pursuant to Garcetti, the 
court granted the School District’s motion for summary judgment.18 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Beginnings of Public Employee Speech Protection 
The Garcetti standard applied by the district court represents the 
recent capstone of the United States Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine on public employee speech. Up until the 
middle of the twentieth century, public employees enjoyed no 
recognized constitutional protection from conditions placed upon 
their employment, including those that restricted constitutional 
rights, such as free speech.19 This trend in the Court’s jurisprudence 
changed course in the 1950s and 60s, as reflected in a number of 
cases that invalidated political affiliation conditions of public 
employment.20 In 1967, the Court rejected the theory “that public 
 
 14. Posey, 2007 WL 420256, at *5. 
 15. Id. at *3 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543–44 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006))). 
 16. Id. at *5. 
 17. Id. (citing Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800–01 (10th Cir. 
2007)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Consider Justice Holmes’ famous words, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts: “[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 
517 (Mass. 1892), cited in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–45 (1983). This sentiment 
symbolized the Supreme Court’s law through the early 1950s. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 
342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“If [public employees] do not choose to work on [terms that 
restrict their freedom of association], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations 
and go elsewhere.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (determining it was 
unconstitutional to deny employment on the basis of previous party membership); Wiemann v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating a requirement to deny past affiliation with the 
Communist party).  
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employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to 
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable . . . .”21 The 
following year, the Court applied this general principle to the speech 
of public employees in the seminal case Pickering v. Board of 
Education.22 
B. Pickering v. Board of Education 
Marvin Pickering, an Illinois high school teacher, was fired for 
sending a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the school’s 
revenue raising proposals.23 While recognizing that the government’s 
role as an employer regulating speech differs from its role in 
regulating the speech of private citizens, the Supreme Court held 
that public employees do not entirely relinquish their First 
Amendment rights by virtue of public employment.24 The Court also 
emphasized the unique and vital role that public employees play in 
fostering free and open debate about matters of public importance 
among an informed electorate—a role that serves the public as a 
whole and that must be protected from the chilling effects of 
retaliation.25  
In deciding cases involving the free speech rights of public 
employees, the Court instructed, an appropriate balance must be 
struck “between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”26 Where the Pickering 
Court declined to lay down a discrete standard for judging this 
delicate balance between individual free speech interests and those of 
the public employer—instead merely “indicat[ing] some of the 
general lines along which an analysis . . . should run”27—the circuit 
 
 21. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967). 
 22. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 23. Id. at 564. 
 24. Id. at 568. 
 25. See id. at 571–72; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“The interest 
at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s 
own right to disseminate it.”). However, the protection of public employee speech is not based 
solely on the policy of preserving open public discourse. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (extending the same protection to private statements by public 
employees on matters of public concern). 
 26. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–69. 
 27. Id. at 569. 
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courts subsequently filled the void with a variety of subtly unique 
standards.28 
C. Connick v. Myers 
Fifteen years later, the Court revisited this maturing standard in 
Connick v. Myers.29 Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers, 
disgruntled by her supervisor’s decision to transfer her to a less 
desirable assignment, was terminated for circulating a questionnaire 
among her associates concerning various potential problems in the 
office working environment.30 Upon review of the lower court’s 
judgment that Myers was fired in retaliation for her exercise of a 
constitutionally protected free speech right,31 the Supreme Court 
solidified the two-part analysis implied by the Pickering Court. First, 
as a threshold, the Court must determine whether the speech may 
“be fairly characterized” as touching upon a matter of public 
concern.32 Then, if the employee’s speech is related to a matter of 
public concern, the Court must proceed to judge whether the 
employer had adequate justification to restrict the employee’s speech 
under the balancing inquiry contemplated in Pickering.33 
D. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
More than two decades later, the Court’s 2006 Garcetti decision 
expanded the test once again, from two parts to three, with the 
addition of yet another threshold inquiry. The Garcetti Court, 
perhaps relying on the compound language (“as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern”) in Connick,34 effectively split the 
Connick threshold test in two. “[W]hen public employees make 
 
 28. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[W]hether a 
public employee’s statements unduly interfere with the efficiency with which governmental 
services are provided.”); Kaprelian v. Tex. Woman’s Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 140 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(whether the employee’s exercise of speech “clearly over-balanced” the employee’s 
“usefulness” as an employee) (citing Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 
1970)); Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974) (whether the employee’s 
speech “substantially and materially interferes with the discharge of duties and responsibilities 
inherent in such employment”). 
 29. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 30. Id. at 140–41. 
 31. Id. at 141–42. 
 32. Id. at 146–47. 
 33. Id. at 146. 
 34. Id. at 147. 
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statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”35 Thus, 
following Garcetti, the standard for determining whether a 
government employer’s restriction on a public employee’s speech 
violates the First Amendment requires three separate inquiries. First, 
a court must determine whether the employee spoke pursuant to his 
official duties, as opposed to speaking as a private citizen.36 If the 
employee spoke as a private citizen, the court then must decide 
whether that speech relates to a matter of public concern.37 Finally, if 
both of these thresholds are met, the court must judge whether the 
employer was justified in restricting the speech, balancing the 
employer’s interests in promoting the effective functioning of its 
enterprise with the interests of free speech.38 
This standard represents the Supreme Court’s effort to balance 
two vital, yet competitive, interests: the government employer’s 
interest in promoting the efficient operation of public services and 
the shared interest of the public employee and the community at 
large in preserving the value of unfettered speech.39 The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 8440 
signals a material shift in this balancing act. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
On review of the district court’s summary judgment in favor of 
the School District, the Ninth Circuit in Posey laid out the framework 
for sustaining a First Amendment retaliation claim: the public 
employee must show “(1) [t]he employee engaged in 
constitutionally protected speech, (2) the employer took adverse 
employment action against the employee, and (3) the employee’s 
speech was a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor in the adverse 
action.”41 The combined Pickering-Connick-Garcetti test answered 
the first of these three elements, and, until Posey, the court answered 
it purely as a matter of law before the remaining two elements were 
 
 35. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 36. Id. at 421–23. 
 37. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19. 
 40. 546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 41. Id. at 1126 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
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to be evaluated by the trier of fact.42 In the opinion of the circuit 
court, however, the Supreme Court’s recent Garcetti decision raised 
the question as to whether the first element remained entirely a 
question of law.43 
Specifically, the circuit court focused on the dispute between 
Posey and the School District as to his job responsibilities. The 
nature of Posey’s job duties was critical to the court’s proper analysis 
of the Garcetti threshold questions, and the district court’s 
determination that Posey’s speech was made pursuant to those duties 
ended the inquiry and supported its summary judgment for the 
School District.44 The parties, however, disputed whether Posey had 
any policy-making responsibilities that would support the conclusion 
that his job duties required his letter and the meeting.45 In Garcetti, 
the circuit court pointed out, there was no such dispute—both sides 
conceded that the speech in question was performed pursuant to the 
speaker’s employment responsibilities.46 In the circuit court’s view, 
the existence of this dispute distinguished Posey’s case from Garcetti, 
and required the court to decide whether Garcetti’s contribution to 
the public employee speech standard “transformed” the protected 
status inquiry “into a mixed question of fact and law.”47 
Looking to its sister courts for guidance, the Ninth Circuit panel 
recognized a split among other circuits deciding this question:48 
specifically, the Fifth,49 Tenth,50 and D.C.51 Circuits had determined 
that all three steps of the inquiry into the protected status of speech 
were matters of law properly decided at summary judgment. The 
other side of the split is a bit hazier: the Third Circuit clearly has 
 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1126–27. 
 45. Id. at 1125; see supra Part II.  
 46. Id. at 1127 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (citing Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 513 n.17 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that, 
even if it requires a factual inquiry, the question of whether employee speech is protected is a 
legal one properly answered at summary judgment)). 
 50. Id. (citing Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202–
03 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that each of the three steps in the protected speech inquiry, 
including the Garcetti question, is to be resolved by the court and not the trier of fact)). 
 51. Id. at 1128 (citing Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the Garcetti inquiry is a question of law for the court to decide and not a 
question of fact)). 
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indicated that the Garcetti inquiry is a mixed question,52 along with 
whom the Seventh Circuit has implicitly agreed;53 additionally, the 
Eighth Circuit had concluded, prior to Garcetti, that the Pickering 
balancing of interests test was a mixed question.54 The Ninth Circuit 
panel sided with the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.55 
In support of its decision to fall on the “mixed question” side of 
the debate, the circuit court in Posey directed its attention to the 
“guidance” offered by the Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., for divining the appropriate distinction 
between questions of fact and law: “[f]acts that can be ‘found’ by 
‘application of . . . ordinary principles of logic and common 
experience . . . are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact.’”56  This 
guiding principle, in connection with the Garcetti Court’s seemingly 
similar recommendation that “‘[t]he proper inquiry is a practical 
one,’ requiring more than mere mechanical reference to ‘[f]ormal 
job descriptions,’”57 led the circuit court to conclude that a “factual 
determination of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities will not encroach 
upon the court’s prerogative to interpret and apply the relevant legal 
rules.”58 Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 2006 Garcetti 
 
 52. Id. (citing Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[W]hether a particular incident of speech is made within a particular plaintiff's job duties is a 
mixed question of fact and law.”)). 
 53. Id. (citing Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008)). The Posey 
court interpreted Davis to find “that since ‘no rational trier of fact could find’ that Davis’s 
speech had been made as a private citizen, summary judgment was appropriate.” Id. (quoting 
Davis, 534 F.3d at 653). 
 54. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ny 
underlying factual disputes concerning whether the speech at issue [is] protected should [be] 
submitted to the jury.”)). 
Further, the Posey court noted that even within the Ninth Circuit, district courts had 
reached conflicting conclusions on the issue. Id. at 1128 n.4 (comparing Neveu v. City of 
Fresno, No. CV-F-04-6490, 2007 WL 2330775, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (question of 
law) with Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist., No. CIV. S-05-0940, 2006 WL 3741878, 
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006) (mixed question), and also citing Clarke v. Multnomah 
County, No. CV-06-229, 2007 WL 915175, at *12 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2007) (determining the 
inquiry to be a question of law but granting summary judgment on the basis that “no 
reasonable juror could conclude anything but all of plaintiff's communications were pursuant 
to her official job duties”)). 
 55. Id. at 1129. 
 56. Id. (quoting 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984)). 
 57. Id. (quoting 547 U.S. 424–25). 
 58. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (“An issue does not lose its 
factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional 
question.”). 
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decision transformed the protected status inquiry from a purely legal 
one into a mixed question of fact and law, with the specific question 
of the “scope and content” of a public employee’s official job duties 
a question of fact.59 
V. ANALYSIS 
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Posey does nothing to 
change the substantive nature of the Supreme Court’s test, by 
transforming one of the three questions from purely legal to mixed, 
it substantially shifts the balance the Court has constructed between 
the two competing policy interests. This shift is a step backward in 
the Court’s effort to resolve the tension between First Amendment 
values and government efficiency. First, the decision is based upon a 
perceived split among the circuits that is not as stark as the Ninth 
Circuit paints it. Second, the decision runs contrary to analogous 
standards guiding similar constitutional doctrines. Finally, as a 
practical matter, the doctrine does little to improve the protection of 
First Amendment values, while greatly hampering the ability of 
government employers to operate efficiently. 
A. The Circuit Split 
The circuit panel in Posey relied on the split among its sister 
circuits as an opportunity to transform the legal standard of the 
protected status inquiry.60 Upon closer examination, however, the 
“split” among the circuits appears more like one outlying circuit, 
accompanied by misinterpreted language from another circuit and 
the extension of yet another circuit’s logic from an application of a 
different standard prior to Garcetti. 
In its interpretation of the Seventh Circuit’s position, the Posey 
court relied on Davis v. Cook County, which determined that “no 
rational trier of fact could find” that the speech was made in the 
capacity of a private citizen.61 In a vacuum, this phrase seemingly 
supports the “question of fact” position on the issue, but the 
surrounding context and ultimate holding imply something 
different. The court in Davis reviewed a summary judgment from the 
 
 59. Id. at 1129–30. 
 60. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
 61. Posey, 546 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
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district court, which found, as a matter of law, that Davis’s speech 
deserved no First Amendment protection.62 The district court’s 
decision was delivered prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Garcetti, but on review, the circuit court applied the new standard 
and upheld the lower court’s summary judgment.63 
Responding to Davis’s argument that the Garcetti question 
should be heard by a jury, the court noted that “‘[t]he inquiry into 
the protected speech is one of law, not fact.’”64 The subsequent 
language quoted by the Ninth Circuit in Posey is a response to 
Davis’s claim of entitlement to a jury trial, deflating that argument in 
the alternative by indicating that “no rational trier of fact could find” 
that her speech was made as a private citizen (even if the question 
were submitted to a jury). Further, the circuit court in Davis then 
proceeded to analyze the facts surrounding Davis’s speech and her 
job responsibilities under the Garcetti test—an exercise the district 
had never conducted—before ultimately holding that her speech did 
not satisfy this threshold prong of the protected speech inquiry.65 
Such an analysis by the court would seem strange indeed, had the 
court not intended to resolve the question as a matter of law. 
The Posey court cites the Eighth Circuit as further support of the 
purported split.66 In Casey v. City of Cabool, that court held that “any 
underlying factual disputes concerning whether the speech at issue 
[is] protected should [be] submitted to the jury.”67 In the first place, 
as the Ninth Circuit points out, this case was decided prior to 
Garcetti, and the quoted language consequently refers to the 
balancing prong of the original Pickering-Connick test.68 Casey at 
best supports an implication that the same logic would extend to the 
recent Garcetti decision—the same form of implication that, 
coincidentally, the Ninth Circuit rejected in Posey by failing to 
maintain its previous standard of legal review when it determined 
that the Garcetti case transformed the question from one of law to a 
 
 62. Davis, 534 F.3d at 651; Davis v. Cook County, No. 04 C 8218, 2006 WL 218166, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2006). 
 63. Davis, 534 F.3d at 652. 
 64. Id. at 653 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See supra note 54. 
 67. 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 
1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 68. See id. at 802–03. 
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mixed question.69 Additionally, since the Garcetti opinion, the 
Eighth Circuit has had the opportunity to apply its innovation to the 
public employee speech threshold, and has consistently applied it as a 
question of law.70 
Finally, the Third Circuit indeed maintains the position that the 
Garcetti analysis poses a mixed question of fact and law with respect 
to whether speech is made within the employee’s job duties.71 In 
sum, what the Ninth Circuit has labeled a “split” among its sister 
circuits in reality amounts to the Third Circuit as an outlier, with the 
Seventh Circuit, to the extent its position is clear at all, curiously 
appearing to side with the Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, and the 
Eighth Circuit consistently interpreting the Garcetti addition as a 
matter of law, despite its approach to the Pickering-Connick test 
prior to Garcetti.72 This tenuous support from only the Third Circuit 
provides little real strength, especially when considered in light of the 
Supreme Court’s trends in similar doctrines, and the practical policy 
in advancing goals discussed below. 
B. Safeguarding Constitutional Boundaries 
Irrespective of the positions of other circuits, the Ninth Circuit’s 
position is difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s own 
 
 69. See Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist, No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1129 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (questioning whether Garcetti transformed the protected speech inquiry from its 
previous status as purely a question of law into a mixed question of fact and law, and then 
deciding that it did). 
 70. See, e.g., Davenport v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 553 F.3d 1110, 1113 (8th  Cir. 
2009) (affirming the finding of the district court, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s speech was 
made pursuant to his official job duties); Kozisek v. County of Seward, 539 F.3d 930, 937 
(8th  Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s ruling that plaintiff’s speech was not protected 
because it was purely job-related); Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 537–38 (8th  Cir. 2007) 
(evaluating plaintiff’s job duties to determine whether his speech was protected under the 
Garcetti threshold); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 2, 471 F.3d 918, 920–21 (8th  
Cir. 2006) (interpreting the Garcetti decision for the first time in the Eighth Circuit and 
indicating that its inquiry is a “question of law for the court” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 
U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)). 
 71. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Foraker 
v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 72. In his summary of this same circuit split, JoNel Newman recognizes only the Ninth 
(Posey) and Third Circuits as having decided the Garcetti analysis is a mixed question. JoNel 
Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate? The 
Eleventh Circuit’s Post-Garcetti Juriprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 786 n.170 (2009). 
The Sixth Circuit appears to support the “question of law” view on the issue as well. See 
Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (deciding the Garcetti 
analysis with no mention of a mixed question).  
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doctrinal patterns. First, Connick itself makes abundantly clear the 
Court’s position prior to Garcetti: “The inquiry into the protected 
status of speech is one of law, not fact.”73 Further, after recognizing 
the difficulty in balancing the competing interests inherent in the 
inquiry, the Connick Court emphasized the obligation that it has “to 
examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they are made to see whether or not they . . . are of a 
character which the principles of the First Amendment . . . 
protect.”74 The Court previously announced this obligation in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and further stressed the importance of the 
Court’s particular role in safeguarding the boundary “‘between 
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may 
legitimately be regulated,’” to ensure that the judgment does not 
inappropriately intrude on free expression.75 “Because of this 
obligation,” the Connick Court declares, “we cannot ‘avoid making 
an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case.’”76 
Thus, the Supreme Court has established a clear policy of 
policing the lines between First Amendment speech rights and other 
competing interests, answering questions of constitutional protection 
as a matter of law, not fact. There is no evidence from the Court to 
suggest that this longstanding mandate should be transformed, 
except for vague language from Garcetti cited by the Ninth Circuit 
to support its change: “[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one.”77 
From this brief phrase, the Ninth Circuit draws a distinction between 
“concrete and practical” and “abstract and formal,” with the former 
relegated to a question of fact and the latter a question of law.78 This 
construction seems to imbue a few selected words with more 
meaning than intended. The Garcetti Court’s words were a response 
rejecting the dissenting opinion writer’s notion that, under the 
majority’s new standard, employers could restrict employees’ rights 
by merely concocting “excessively broad job descriptions.”79 The 
 
 73. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983). 
 74. Id. at 150 n.10 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)). 
 75. 376 U.S. 254, 284–85 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 
(1958)). 
 76. 461 U.S. at 150 n.10 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) 
(Brennan, J.)). 
 77. Garcetti  v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006), cited in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille 
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 78. Posey, 546 F.3d at 1129. 
 79. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:20 PM 
285 Transforming the Public Employee Speech Standard 
 297 
inquiry is “a practical one”—that is, the court cannot rely solely on 
the formal job descriptions of an employee in order to determine the 
protected status of the speech.80 Nothing in that reasoning implies 
that the Garcetti Court intended to alter its deeply held commitment 
to review the protected speech question as a matter of law, and the 
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on this language is therefore misplaced. 
C. Practical and Economic Concerns 
Finally, practical policy considerations weigh against the Ninth 
Circuit’s transformation. The Supreme Court’s construction of the 
current public employee speech standard is a well-crafted balance 
between the competing interests of government efficiency and First 
Amendment free speech values.81 The government would bear a 
substantial burden were it subject to the same standard in regulating 
its employees’ speech as it is in regulating private citizen speech. 
Indeed, the Court’s recognition of this burden animates the 
deference the Court gives to government employers in making 
employment decisions that restrict free speech.82 This deference is 
reflected not only in the substance of the combined protected status 
test, but also in the review standard under which it is conducted.83 
While the Posey court left the substance of the Pickering-Connick-
Garcetti analysis intact, by transforming the legal review standard to 
include a question of fact it effectively shifted the balance that the 
test reflects. The result is a greater social cost, with little free speech 
benefit. 
On the one hand, the shift does little to further protect the 
interests of free speech. Ignoring the potential difference in outcome 
between the trier of fact and the court as the interpreter of law 
deciding the question, the real difference is one of timing and costs, 
not ultimate outcome. While this may produce some nominal value 
to plaintiffs who live to fight another day in court, its curb on the 
chilling effect to speech is likely minimal. 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 417; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 82. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (noting that the Pickering standard and its progeny 
reflect “the common sense realization that government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter”). 
 83. See id. at 150 n.10. 
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On the other hand, the real impact of this shift will be 
recognized in the public cost of litigation stemming from lawsuits by 
government employees that will survive summary judgment and 
proceed to the conclusion of fact-trying. In the form of increased 
settlement value for retaliation claims, the public will bear the cost of 
the switch, not to mention the indirect effect it will have on the 
efficiency of government employers who will base employment 
decisions on the heightened cost of potential litigation. Under the 
purely legal review standard, summary judgment is available in cases 
where the speech at issue is determined by the court to be made 
pursuant to official job duties. This is the practical benefit of 
incremental threshold inquiries—they avoid the later questions 
where unnecessary. In fact, the entire first element of a First 
Amendment retaliation claim is designed to filter claims before 
proceeding to the factual inquiry of the last two elements.84  
The Ninth Circuit panel in Posey seemed to recognize the 
practicality of this reasoning, yet with no explanation, the court 
rearranged the order of the inquiry elements, switching the typically 
first threshold of Garcetti to the final question of the protected 
speech inquiry.85 Perhaps the court realized the practical conundrum 
of engaging in questions of fact only to return again to purely legal 
questions that could make the factual questions moot. Now that the 
court has transformed the Garcetti analysis into a mixed question of 
fact and law, that inquiry must trail the remaining Pickering-Connick 
tests in order to avoid a logistical quandary. 
The upshot of this change is a greatly reduced prospect of 
summary judgment for government employers. Any employee 
plaintiff can easily create a dispute as to the scope and content of his 
job responsibilities, thereby forcing a factual inquiry and avoiding 
summary judgment’s procedural safeguard of the government 
employer’s interest in efficiency.86 Thus, the Connick Court’s fear has 
become prophetic: every employment decision risks the prospect of 
becoming subject to a fact trial as a constitutional matter.87 
 
 84. See Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 85. Id. at 1130–31. 
 86. This ease is illustrated by Posey itself. The court notes that the parties “shifted” their 
characterizations of Posey’s job duties after the “identification of the relevant legal questions at 
issue in [the] case.” Id. at 1125 n.1. 
 87. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s transformation in Posey alters the protected 
status inquiry into public employee speech in a way that runs 
contrary to the weight of circuit court opinion on the issue, current 
Supreme Court law, and the practical underpinnings of the doctrine. 
Treating the Garcetti analysis as a mixed question of fact and law 
introduces unpredictable and inconsistent factual interpretation in a 
way that directly impacts the line between constitutionally protected 
and unprotected speech. This practice stands in stark opposition to 
the serious obligation of the courts to preserve the carefully crafted 
boundaries of competing constitutional interests and risks upsetting 
a delicate constitutional balance between government and its 
employees’ speech. 
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